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HOW TO DO THINGS WITH THE FIRST
AMENDMENT
PIERRE SCHLAG*
The fading away of [XI is signaled not by silence but by more
and more talk, more journals, more symposia, and more entries
in the contest for the right to sum up [X's] story. There will
come a time when it is a contest no one will want to win, when
the announcement of still another survey of [XI is received not
as a promise but as a threat, and when the calling of still
another conference on the function of [X in our time will elicit
only a groan. that time may have come: [X's] day is dying; the
hour is late; and the only thing left for a [student of X] is to
say so, which is what I have been saying here, and, I think not
a moment too soon.
Stanley Fish'
I am not here to criticize Stanley Fish's presentation. I am
here to interpret it. I am not here to defend or to criticize the
First Amendment. In an important sense, I won't have much to
say about the First Amendment at all.
Now, you're probably thinking: He can't do that. This is a
conference on the First Amendment. He's got to talk about the
First Amendment. Well, yes. And in a way, I will. But as I see
it, all this talk about "The First Amendment" is no more about
the First Amendment than fear of stepping on a crack in the
sidewalk is about sidewalks. The First Amendment here is, in all
sorts of ways, the sidewalk. And I'm not interested in sidewalks.
And so, I will have absolutely nothing to say about where the
cracks should be located on the First Amendment sidewalk, or
whether they should be moved or why or anything of the sort.
What I want to talk about is what Stanley Fish is doing and how
he does it.
So is Stanley Fish right about the First Amendment? Of
course, he is right. He is right from a certain perspective. And his
rightness, of course, must itself be an interested partisan perspec-
tive-namely his own. Now to call Stanley Fish's perspective an
* Professor, University of Colorado School of Law. I wish to thank Bill Goldberg
for his comments and suggestions.
1. Stanley Fish, Consequences, in AGAINST THEoRY: LITERARY STUDIES AND THE
NEw PRAGMATISM 106, 128 (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1985).
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interested partisan one is not an objection, much less a refutation
of his argument. It is rather, as he might say, its restatement.
So what has Stanley Fish been doing here? He has been doing
what all legal thinkers strive to do when they talk and write about
the First Amendment. What they do-within the limits of their
capacities and their agendas-is try to make "The First Amend-
ment" their own. They are all, in other words, busily composing
their own version of that famous, apocryphal, but utterly emblem-
atic, piece of scholarship: "What the First Amendment Means to
me." They are all, as they "edify," "clarify," "expand" or
"contract" the First Amendment trying to inscribe their own
politics, their own agendas into the First Amendment.
Now, to this claim, there is, of course, an immediate objection.
The objection is that while some legal thinkers are clearly projecting
their fondest, indeed sometimes florid, hopes into the First Amend-
ment, there are many others who seem to show an utterly subser-
vient and reverential attitude for the First Amendment and its
demands. Think here of a certain kind of a First Amendment
purist or a doctrinally-chastened legal thinker. These thinkers and
their subservience are readily identifiable because you will see them
routinely offer up their own cherished political commitments as
sacrifices on the altar of the First Amendment.
This desire for self-abnegation, for self-denial before a higher
power, is familiar. It is what we call in ethics, self-mastery, in
theology, worship, in psychoanalysis, masochism and in jurispru-
dence, legal process. Those who strive so hard to submit their
writings and their talks to the exigent and intransigent commands
of the First Amendment are seeking to be bound, and this desire
for bondage-and we must use that word, for it is the word they
use-this too is an interested perspective. And its interested char-
acter becomes quite obvious, when one realizes that this desire for
bondage is meant for export. It is then what we call in ethics,
mastery over others, in theology, proselytizing, in psychoanalysis,
sadism and in jurisprudence, legal process.
This desire for bondage to a higher law is, of course, eminently
understandable. I'll skip the ethical, theological, psychoanalytic
accounts and go straight for the jurisprudence. This desire for
bondage to a higher law is what gives legal thinkers perhaps what
they desire most: the sense that they actually "know" something
and that what they know actually has some power. What they
know they call "reason" and what they want is for reason to be
in charge of power. This, of course, is the standard issue liberal
1096
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enlightenment dream. (I won't deal here with its Marxian twin).
What many legal thinkers want is for the dream to come true.
The premium juridical test site for the dream-the laboratory
as it were-is the First Amendment. It is the key site, because it
presents the challenge in its purest form and, at least at first
glance, its easiest form. Thus, it might be said of the liberal
enlightenment thinker and the First Amendment exactly the inverse
of what is said about New York: If you cannot make it here, you
cannot make it anywhere.
Among the many things that the First Amendment offers to
the liberal enlightenment thinker is the opportunity to work out
some key liberal enlightenment distinctions. Now, some of these
key distinctions appear in Stanley Fish's presentation; others do
not. But it doesn't matter much because, in the jurisprudential
lore of the First Amendment, these distinctions are all, for most
purposes, variations on each other. They are all homologies of the
liberal enlightenment attempt to distinguish reason and power. The
key homologous distinctions mentioned in Stanley Fish's paper are:
.speech action
free speech consequential speech
constative utterance performative utterance2





Anyone wanting to press the point, will immediately see that
all these distinctions are all also variations on the mind/body
distinction-a distinction that Fish does not mention explicitly in
his presentation, but nonetheless exploits ruthlessly through the
strategic use of adjectives- "bloodless" being I think the most
memorable.
Now, what makes the First Amendment challenging for the
liberal enlightenment thinker is that some such distinction must be
made to define the scope of the First Amendment and it must be
made from a perspective or a place that is itself free and not
2. Stanley Fish, Fraught With Death: Skepticism, Progressivism, and the First
Amendment, 64 U. CoLo. L. Rv. 1061 (1993).
3. (Citations omitted).
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consequential, a place that is itself persuasion and not coercion, a
place that is [ . . and not [ . .1. Stanley Fish describes the
strategies used to describe that place. The distinctions are familiar:






In Stanley Fish's argument, all these distinctions-both the first
and the second set-bite the dust. And they bite the dust in all
the usual ways-ways which I have somewhat uncharitably iden-
tified in terms that are also fraught with death.
The first of Stanley Fish's moves is the least interesting,
because most common. It is the least used in Fish's argument. It
is:
1. Radical Perspectivalism. This move is used by Fish to show
that any attempt to draw the critical enlightenment First Amend-
ment distinctions, must recognize that these distinctions are always
drawn from some point of view. The next step is to point out that
there are indeed many points of view and that the identity of the
critical distinctions depends upon the point of view whence they
are drawn. But this cannot be (or so the argument goes) because
the very identity of the critical distinctions also requires that they
cannot be drawn from a particular point of view.
2. Suicidal Conceptual Purification. This move serves to render
the enlightenment distinctions impossible. Stanley Fish argues that
in order to be able to discharge their functions, the categories of
reason (free speech or truth or whatever) must be demarcated as
completely separate from their opposing terms. But thus purified
of interest, desire, agenda, program or any of the other terms that
could supply motivation, these categories of reason turn out to be
utterly empty. In Fish's own words, they are "formal," "thin,"
"substanceless," "bodiless," "empty," "bloodless" and "ab-
stract." They have, in Ronald Dworkin's telling invocation of the
well-worn phrase, worked themselves pure-so pure, in fact that
nothing remains. 4 Total purification means total emptiness. And
being utterly empty, such disembodied free speech and free speech
values cannot produce anything nor contain anything of value.
They have become like Gertrude Stein's Oakland: there is no there
there.
4. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Ambitions for Itself, 71 VA. L. REv. 173 (1985).
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3. Transitive Conceptual Contamination. Not surprisingly, Fish
insists that these totally purified categories are impossible. They
are impossible because, they could only be created from an inter-
ested, partisan, political perspective. In other words, these purified
categories either do not exist or they are fatally contaminated by
desire, politics, interest and so on. And, of course, true to the
metaphor of contamination they are not just a little bit contami-
nated. Contamination is not a matter of degree-at least not from
the perspective of the party contaminated. To give an example:
When Stanley Fish following Robert Post following Frank Easter-
brook following Catharine McKinnon recognizes that pornographic
speech has a performative (non-reasoning) dimension, he like all
the others is led to acknowledge that all speech has a performative
dimension.5 The point is that once the contamination starts, it is
contamination all the way through. That is because, as Fish would
have it, there is no uncontaminated place from which to draw an
uncontaminated line. Once contaminated with the guilty knowl-
edge, paradise is lost, and there's just no way of getting back.
In First Amendment jurisprudence, the guilty knowledge is
precisely this knowledge that all speech has a performative dimen-
sion. It is the knowledge that merely in speaking, something is
already being done. This is dangerous knowledge. It is expressed
periodically in the academic literature (and then forgotten over
and over again). Indeed, before Frank Easterbrook and Robert
Post and Stanley Fish and now I and indeed now you, were led
to recognize that all speech has a performative dimension, the
point had been articulated by John Hart Ely.
Ely had been confronting a rather popular theory of the time
which divided the realm of human behavior into two purportedly
distinct categories: action and expression. This was the theory
advanced by Thomas Emerson, who argued that while "action"
was not protected by the First Amendment, "expression" was. 6 I
remember this theory well, because at the time, I was a law student
taking the First Amendment course. I thought Emerson had de-
veloped a truly great theory-one with obvious economizing vir-
tues. I was hoping the theory would hold up. But it was not to
5. As a scholar of speech-act theory and the work of Austin, Stanley Fish, of course,
was prepared to recognize this all along. J. L. AusTiN, How TO Do THINGS WITH WORDS
145-47 (1989). In turn, all of this was previously known-one way or another-to Witt-
genstein and Nietzsche, and . . . in short, the contamination reaches very far back.
6. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 17
(1966) (action/expression).
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be. Indeed, Emerson's theory had already been dealt a death blow
in 1975, when John Hart Ely succinctly pointed out in reference
to the O'Brien' case, that draft card burning, "is an undifferen-
tiated whole, 100% action and 100% expression. It involves no.
conduct that is not at the same time communication, and no
communication that does not result from conduct." 8
And of course, in accordance with the logic of transitive
conceptual contamination, it turned out that this truth about draft
card burning became a truth about symbolic speech in general-
and then about speech in general. Indeed, in the very movement
from John Hart Ely's textual comments respecting O'Brien to his
supporting footnote, we already have an amplification of the
point. 9 So the transitive conceptual contamination proceeds apace:
what is true of burning of draft cards, becomes true of symbolic
speech becomes true of all speech.
Now while this point has epidemic implications difficult to
cabin, it is also the sort of point that is forgotten over and over
again in the academic First Amendment literature. It is a point
which, in order for standard liberal First Amendment literature to
sustain itself, must be forgotten over and over again. Indeed,
forgetting this point is a pre-condition to doing standard liberal
First Amendment thought. To put it another way, if you are the
sort of person who cannot tell the difference between action and
expression or their substitute homologies, you simply cannot do
standard liberal First Amendment thought. This, as Stanley Fish
might say, is a condition devoutly to be wished for; and if you
can hold on to it, it's yours.
Now, this I think this sets forth the broad outlines of Stanley
Fish's argumentative strategy. Notice what Fish has done here. He
has represented (and in a sense, quite accurately, I think) the
liberal enlightenment First Amendment in its prototypical object-
forms: sharp lines, boundaries, stable identities, etc. As the two
7. United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
8. John Hart Ely, Comment, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of
Categorization and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482, 1495
(1975).
9. In Professor Ely's footnote, it is the entire expression/action dichotomy (without
limitation) that is found wanting:
The expression-action distinction is by no means all there is to Professor Emer-
son's theory of the first amendment. His sensitive explication of the values
underlying that amendment cannot be ignored by anyone who would try to
understand it. The impulse to define clear categories, and thus better to safeguard
freedom of expression in times of national panic, is also one I share. I simply
do not think this distinction can be made to work.
Ely, supra note 8, at 1495 n.53 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
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lists above reveal, this liberal enlightenment First Amendment is
very clear, very neat, very stable, very static. Meanwhile, the world
which Stanley Fish fashions for this highly objectified First Amend-
ment is very much an animated one. It is a world animated
according to some rather peculiar poststructuralist logics: including
as I have called them, radical perspectivalism, suicidal conceptual
purification and transitive conceptual contamination.
Now in a world that is characterized by these somewhat
unfriendly logics, the attempt to construct a box around whatever
it is one values-say, free speech, for instance-is as eminently
understandable as it is ill advised. There is a deathly-indeed a
suicidal-asymmetry here. And this asymmetry manifests itself in
three problems.
The first problem might be called the problem of recognition.
Basically, the problem is that standard-issue enlightenment liber-
alism is just not equipped to understand the sort of world it is
dealing with here. It won't even know where it is, much less how
it got here or how the hell to get out. Very likely it won't even
recognize that it is in serious intellectual trouble. 10 It won't even
realize when it has made a faux pas. In short, in this world, it
doesn't have a chance. Now, if this seems too alarmist, or if you
have absolutely no idea what I am talking about, that just proves
my point exactly. Indeed, given the sort of poststructuralist ani-
mation in Stanley Fish's text, it is a stone-cold cinch that the
clumsy objectifications of the liberal enlightenment First Amend-
ment will have a life that is nasty, brutish and short. Indeed, its
life is over before it even begins.
The second problem is one of identity. In Fish's text, the First
Amendment is constantly searching for a place to be-a place
beyond rhetoric, beyond politics. It is looking for a place where
neutrality is just neutrality, truth is just truth and so on. But in
Stanley Fish's world (and perhaps more vexingly, in yours too, it
turns out) there is no such place-not in the past, not in the
present and not in the future. And if there were (which there
isn't), you couldn't get to it from here anyway." The ontology
won't allow for it. The construction of the field in terms of radical
perspectivalism, suicidal conceptual purification and transitive con-
10. But it is. See Pierre Schlag, Cannibal Moves: An Essay on the Metamorphoses
of the Legal Distinction, 40 STAN. L. REV. 929 (1988).
11. Hence, consider, that in Fish's construction of the search-for-truth rationale, the
liberal enlightenment first amendment is going to have to search for truth beyond an ever
receding poststructuralist barrier constructed out of an endless semiotic deferral.
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ceptual contamination ensure that there is never a coincidence
between the description of identity and identity itself. Dislocation
is the ontological rule. Violation of the rule means coming to rest.
And coming to rest means death.
The third problem is one of motivation. The liberal enlight-
enment First Amendment couldn't move itself even if it wanted
to. But, of course, it doesn't want to. And it doesn't want to
because it has real motivation problems. The problem is that the
liberal enlightenment First Amendment is just like an object. And
being just like an object, this First Amendment has no ability to
move itself. Instead, it is utterly dependent upon, and captive to,
external forces for movement and direction; hence it is subject to
the implosion produced through suicidal conceptual purification,
the perpetual displacement effected through transitive conceptual
contamination and the erratic dislocations prompted by radical
perspectivalism.12
INTERLUDE
Now, for those who are interested in criticizing Fish's
argument, there is no doubt some mileage to be gained by
focusing attention on the way that his constitutive object-
form metaphors have boxed the liberal enlightenment vision
of First Amendment into a highly stable object-form, while
his animated description of the world in which the First
Amendment must operate is fraught with motion, move-
ment, change and so on. Now, of course, before you pursue
this line of criticism, you might want to consider whether
these liberal enlightenment First Amendment boxes that
Stanley Fish has evoked are yours as well. And if these are
also your boxes, now would be a really good time to wonder
why and how it is that you are so fond of boxes. Not to
put too fine a point on it, but why remain so attached to
boxes even in the midst of an article whose very title reads,
"Fraught with Death: [... 1, [... ], and [... ]?"). I have
some answers to this question, but it would be unseemly
to present them here.
13
END OF INTERLUDE
12. Some of these points have been previously elaborated at greater length in Pierre
Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEo. L.J. 37 (1987).
13. That's why they are presented elsewhere. See elsewhere Pierre Schlag, Clerks in
the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. (forthcoming 1993) (discussing the answers).
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Now, to get back to the main action: Is Stanley Fish here
merely ganging up on enlightenment liberalism or the First Amend-
ment? I don't think so. He's doing much more than that. What
he is doing here is exploiting-and I don't mean this in a pejorative
sense-a kind political equivalent to Zeno's paradox. 4 Stanley Fish
is playing with the political juxtaposition of static and dynamic
frames. This is perhaps most evident in his construction of the
search-for-truth rationale as an inexorable semiotic deferral: No
matter how much progress is made in the search for truth, the
target-the truth-can never be reached. The truth is always al-
ready receding from the advances that are made to reach it. That,
of course, is because "the truth" has been constructed as a static
object located in a future that is always already dynamically out-
distancing our attempts to reach it. This sort of juxtaposition of
static and dynamic frames may well be logically forbidden when
dealing with motion in space, but politics is not logic. On the
contrary, a good working definition of politics is: the art of the
impossible.
Presented in this light, Stanley Fish's arguments above are all
instantiations of a cardinal rule of politics: All politics worthy of
the name presume, and indeed must presume, that the conditions
they seek to realize are already extant to some significant degree.
To what significant degree? The answer to that question depends,
among other things, upon the content and configuration of the
particular politics in question. This, of course, is something of a
hedge.
So to restate the point in an overly strong, but more inter-
esting, clearer fashion: any politics worthy of the name can only
get started, by presuming that its epistemics are in some significant
way already in control, already in power. Now to make that sort
of presumption once one recognizes the historicity of one's own
situation takes a lot of chutzpah. Historicity is what secures the
contingency of epistemics. Historicity is what implies-no, it is
what guarantees-the death of each and every politics and each
and every epistemic (including each and every politics and every
epistemic that seeks to become law). And so when chutzpah fails,
what we have is dissonance-between what a politics holds to be
necessary for its own realization and its perception of the field
14. For a description of Zeno's paradox, see 2 W.K.C. GUTHRIE, A HISTORY OF
GREEK PHIosoPHY 91-93 (1965).
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within which it is operating. This condition is hardly unique to
contemporary liberalism. We can find utterly analogous instances
in Marxism and in the other discursive offspring of the enlight-
enment. 5 The thing to recognize is that once this point is reached-
once there is dissonance-the faith is shaken. It is at this point
that a politics-any politics-becomes, in Stanley's Fish's words,
"fraught with death." Fraught with intimations of its own death.
And it is precisely this loss of faith, this dissonance, that Fish
describes and exploits so elegantly throughout his entire presenta-
tion. Indeed, if the partisans of the enlightenment liberal First
Amendment seem so morose and so anguished, it is precisely
because they cling to the necessity of drawing a certain set of iron-
clad distinctions (the distinctions listed above) and yet recognize
that not only does the world fail to conform to those distinctions,
but that indeed, the world, as it is now, will never conform to
those distinctions.
In short, what seems so disappointing to the First Amendment
advocates in Fish's presentation is that free speech is impossible.
Now, this notion that "free speech" is impossible seems like a
startling conclusion until, of course, we remember that this was
exactly the point with which Fish started his presentation. If you
remember, he said right up front that free speech is impossible.
He said and I quote "There's no such thing as free speech.' ' 6
And then he elaborated: speech is not free 1) because speech is
constrained and constraining; 2) because (when it takes) it produces
costs; and 3) because speech is not weightless. And then he said,
"Free speech does not exist."'' 7 Now if free speech is defined as
a thing that does not exist, then it a cinch that any view of the
First Amendment which claims that its raison d'etre is to protect
free speech is at the very least somewhat confused. Indeed, in
Fish's words, the First Amendment, and I quote, "will be pro-
tecting something that doesn't exist."'" Yes, exactly so. Now, if
15. I don't want to suggest that liberalism is particularly deficient in having such a
problem. All offspring of the enlightenment have this problem. Indeed, Marxists have had
sustained difficulties dealing with an entirely homologous paradox. For Marxists, the same
problem makes its appearance in the question having to do with the coming to consciousness
of the proletariat. The proletariat, of course, is the universal class, the agent of history.
What happens when it doesn't realize its historical mission or worse, it becomes politically
regressive? It is this sort of anxious question that triggers the entire dialectic of Marxian
argument (including the disagreements of Ivan Illyich Lenin and Rosa Luxemburg) about
the nature of class consciousness, the proper role of the vanguard party, voluntarism, and
so on.




HOW TO DO THINGS
the First Amendment has to go through Fish's text trying to protect
something that doesn't exist, then it probably is not going to meet
with a great deal of success.
Exactly so. And similarly, if the liberal enlightenment First
Amendment with its strong objectivist cast has to defend itself in
a world whose motions and movements are scripted by an animist
like Fish (an animist who is keen on radical perspectivalism, sui-
cidal conceptual purification, transitive conceptual contamination,
and inexorable semiotic deferrals), then it's also a cinch that it
won't last long. The game has been rigged at yet another level.
Indeed, Fish's argument has been totally and elegantly rigged-
rigged through and through. Now, none of this is an objection to
Stanley Fish's argument. Not at all. I realize, this may seem
counterintuitive, so let me explain: If one were to say to someone
like Ronald Dworkin, that he has rigged the game, Dworkin would
take that as an insult. But if one says this to Stanley Fish, he will
take it as the highest form of compliment, because it is a confir-
mation of what he has been saying for some time now. Indeed,
what he has been saying might be summarized in Lyotard's slogan,
"Nothing can be said about reality that does not presuppose it."
That is all there is. And for Stanley Fish there is nothing to
bemoan about this state of affairs.
Now one of the ironic twists here-one that may console the
First Amendment advocates-is that most of what Stanley Fish is
saying here actually has nothing to do in particular or in general
with the First Amendment. It has everything to do with the prac-
tices of fetishism and idolatry. "The First Amendment," in Stanley
Fish's essay, is the fetish-the main one of three-destined to take
the fall. And if you remain fixated on "The First Amendment"
you'll end up on the sidewalk too, taking the fall as well. Now,
you may think this is rather rude. But it's not. It's poetic justice:
Don't spend so much time looking at the cracks. Watch where
you are going. And another thing: learn to let go of your boxes
... even when they are marked with your favorite signifiers-
signifiers like "The First Amendment."
Now, I grant you as jurisprudential signifiers go "The First
Amendment" seems pretty powerful. In American jurisprudential
cosmology, this "First Amendment" is no ordinary icon. But
powerful as this signifier may be, it tends to pale next to the
signifier marked "death." Take your time and think about it. If
necessary balance them for a while: On this side, "First Amend-
ment"; on that side, "Death." "First Amendment" -"Death,"
1993] 1105
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"First Amendment" -"Death" O.K.?
Now, of course, Stanley Fish is not Ingmar Bergman and law
is not a chess game. But you had better believe that in Fish's
argument, "Death" is going to win hands down against "The
First Amendment." Indeed, he tells you so in his title: that "The
First Amendment," is "Fraught with Death." Believe him. He
really means it. Indeed, in all of Stanley Fish's essays (I may be
overstating the point slightly) there is always a major signifier that
some people usually care a great deal about that will take the hit-
signifiers like "theory" or "critical self-consciousness" or "liber-
alism" and so on. 19
Now here, the main signifier fraught with death just happens
to be the First Amendment. But there are two other signifiers also
marked for death in Fish's essay: progressivism and skepticism,
but these are lesser marks; they pale in the shadow of the signifier,
"The First Amendment." Notice something about this signifier.
In Stanley Fish's presentation, this signifier is fairly thin. Indeed,
Fish says outright it is "thin." And Fish also performatively
demonstrates that it is thin. After all, what is this thing, "The
First Amendment," in Stanley Fish's presentation? Well, for one
thing, it is a self-consuming artifact: it is the kind of thing that is
trying to protect something that doesn't exist-namely, free speech.
Now, that is a really thin thing to do. But the signifier "The First
Amendment" is thin in other ways as well: It is thin in the sense
that in Fish's paper, "The First Amendment" is barely represented
at all before it gets into serious trouble. In Fish's paper, that
signifier, "The First Amendment," is fleshed out in only the
sparsest manner-with a few quotes from distinguished law school
professors and a few aphorisms from Law's Nietzsche, Oliver
Wendell Holmes (who has already said everything worth saying).
This, then, is the identity of the First Amendment that bites
the dust. No other. So if, like all these legal thinkers, you want
to write on the body of this First Amendment, you have just made
a serious category mistake. This First Amendment has no body.
It is really thin. It is not worth writing on.
So if you actually cared when Fish's First Amendment bit the
dust, then he got you. He got you, because there is no reason-a
19. On "theory" and "critical self-consciousness," see STANLEY FISH, DoING WHAT
COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY IN LITERARY AND
LEGAL STUDIES 372-98, 436-70 (1989). On "liberalism," see Stanley Fish, Liberalism Doesn't
Exist, 1987 DUKE L.J. 997.
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word that cannot possibly be used carefully enough here-to be
at all upset when this essentially empty icon bites the dust. Fish's
First Amendment is really thin. Not only does he tell you so-
repeatedly-but performatively he keeps evacuating whatever con-
tent you might try to put in there. Why do you hang on? Or more
precisely: just what is it that you are hanging on to?
So what is the point you say? What is Fish's message? Stanley
Fish doesn't have a message. What he has is a rhetoric. Do you
want to walk away with a message anyway? O.K. here's a good
one.20 Do not take false Gods. Do not worship graven images.
Also, remember, Just do it. The alternative (and it is a bleak one),
is that, as Stanley Fish puts it, "the condition of being a machine
... may be the fate we make love to."'21
And if you think this is too alarmist or too apocalyptic a
vision even to consider, then I invite you to look at that other
First Amendment-the one that is worked under by the Supreme
Court of the United States of America. Think about that First
Amendment. Indeed, consider that of all the excruciatingly over-
wrought labyrinthine corridors of "The Constitution," it may be
the First Amendment that is the most labyrinthine of them all. As
rights go, the First Amendment is right up to date-it is bureauc-
racy made the best it can be. It is bureaucracy working itself
pure-making itself into an endless subdivision of compartments
each with its own test and its four-part or five part, very contextual
factors. The United States Supreme Court and its academic group-
ies in the law schools have succeeded in doing what many, only a
few decades ago, would have thought impossible. They have suc-
ceeded in making Kafka look naive.
So there it is.
Is it possible after reading Fish to reconstruct a First Amend-
ment that would be immune from these serious flaws? Sure, of
course. Not to worry. But, remember-just as a cautionary sug-
gestion-that it is also possible to reconstruct a unicorn. And note
too that no matter how serious and rigorous your efforts at
argumentative reconstruction of the unicorn may be, all you will
have, at the end, assuming, of course, that things work out for
the very best, is, a "unicorn"-a "unicorn" preceded by very
serious, very rigorous, supporting arguments.
20. It too is self-consuming, you understand.
21. Fish, supra note 3, at 1083.
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